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____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
2FISHER, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Chelsea Yocum appeals from the 138-month term of imprisonment
imposed by the District Court.  Yocum contends that although she was convicted of a
drug offense following a trial, the District Court erred in declining to grant a two-level
downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility because the government refused to
enter with her into a plea agreement to dismiss a related firearms charge.  For the reasons
set forth below, we reject Yocum’s argument and will affirm the order of the District
Court.
I.
As we write solely for the parties, and the facts are known to them, we will discuss
only those facts pertinent to our conclusion.  Yocum was charged with three counts
arising out of an alleged drug trafficking conspiracy:  conspiracy to distribute and
possession with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine (count I);
distribution and possession with the intent to distribute 50 grams or more of crack cocaine
(count II); and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense (count
VI).  Yocum entered a plea of not guilty to the charges and proceeded to trial.  During the
trial, the District Court granted the government’s motion to dismiss count I of the
indictment.  At the conclusion of the case, the jury convicted Yocum on count II and
acquitted her on count VI.
The District Court fixed Yocum’s range of imprisonment at 135 to 168 months, a1
finding which has not been disputed on appeal.  (App. 51.)  In fixing this range, the court
declined to impose a two-level enhancement under Section 2D1.1(b)(1) of the Guidelines
for an offense involving a firearm, and/or a four-level enhancement under Section
3B1.1(a) for being an organizer of a criminal enterprise.  (App. 50.)  Yocum’s conviction
at count II carries a minimum term of imprisonment of 120 months.  See 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii).
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Prior to Yocum’s initial sentencing hearing, she objected to the failure of the
presentence investigation report to recommend a two-level reduction in her guidelines
offense level for acceptance or responsibility pursuant to Section 3E1.1(a) of the United
States Sentencing Guidelines.  At the hearing, her attorney argued that she was entitled to
the reduction because Yocum had never disputed at trial that she had sold drugs. 
According to Yocum’s counsel, she went to trial only because the government refused to
allow her to plead to the drug offense at count II in exchange for dismissing the gun
offense at count VI – the charge on which she was eventually acquitted.  (App. 36-37,
84.)  In essence, Yocum claimed that she had “nothing to lose” by going to trial because
the government would not accept a reasonable plea agreement.  (App. 84.)
The District Court rejected Yocum’s argument and declined to find that she had
accepted responsibility.  The District Court sentenced Yocum to 150 months’
imprisonment, a fine of $2000, and a $100 special assessment.   On appeal, we affirmed1
Yocum’s conviction, but vacated and remanded her sentence pursuant to United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  See United States v. Yocum, 127 Fed. Appx. 590 (3d Cir.
2005).
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C.2
§ 1291.  We apply a clearly erroneous standard of review to the District Court’s decision
that Yocum did not accept responsibility and was not entitled to a reduction in her offense
level.  United States v. Rodriguez, 975 F.2d 999, 1008 (3d Cir. 1992).  This standard of
review remains appropriate in the post-Booker world of “reasonableness” review, as we
are still required to determine initially whether the District Court properly calculated the
4
Yocum renewed her argument for a reduction in her offense level at her
resentencing hearing.  Her attorney referenced “the extraordinary change” that had
occurred in his client since her last hearing, and he requested the court to “drop her down
a level or two for accepting responsibility for what she did and those efforts that she
made.”  (App. 60.)  Yocum addressed the court, stating that she “realized[d] everything
I’ve done now” and that she “accept[ed] everything.”  (Id.)  The District Court thereafter
decided to sentence Yocum to 138 months’ imprisonment, a 12-month decrease from the
initial sentence that was imposed.  In reaching this sentence, the court told Yocum that he
wanted
to recognize . . . the efforts that you’ve made since you’ve been in jail.  I
don’t know if they’re sincere, if they’re going to be lasting or not.  But I’m
going to make a slight adjustment in the sentence based on those
submissions.
(App. 72-73.)
II.
Yocum appeals from her sentence on the ground that the District Court clearly
erred in failing to grant the two-level reduction in her offense level for acceptance of
responsibility.   Although the commentary to Section 3E1.1 and our caselaw recognize2
applicable guidelines range under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4).  See United States v. Vampire
Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 2006).  Yocum does not argue that the sentence
imposed by the District Court was unreasonable.  She appeals solely from the District
Court’s failure to grant a two-level reduction in her offense level for acceptance of
responsibility.  However, to the extent that Yocum argues that the District Court should
have exercised its discretion to grant her a greater downward departure, we agree with the
government that we lack jurisdiction over the District Court’s exercise of that discretion. 
U.S. v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 332-33 (3d Cir. 2006); U.S. v. Denardi, 892 F.2d 269,
271-72 (3d Cir. 1989).
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that the adjustment may be applicable in “rare situations” when a defendant proceeds to
trial, the adjustment is generally not warranted if a defendant “puts the government to its
burden of proof at trial.”  United States v. DeLeon-Rodriguez, 70 F.3d 764, 767 (3d Cir.
1995) (finding that adjustment not warranted where the defendant “contested his guilt . . .
beyond a mere legal challenge”); see United States v. Thomas, 315 F.3d 190, 205-06 (3d
Cir. 2002); United States v. Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 193-94 (3d Cir. 2001); see also U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1 cmt. n.2 (stating that “the adjustment is not
intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by
denying the essential elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and
expresses remorse”).
This case is not one of those “rare situations” in which a post-conviction
adjustment for acceptance of responsibility is appropriate.  Here, the record does not
reflect that Yocum made any pretrial proffer of guilt to the government.  With respect to
count II, she contested the government’s proof at trial, cross-examined the government’s
witnesses, and argued in her summation that she was not guilty of the offense.  In
6addition, she brought an appeal to this court in which she attacked the sufficiency of the
government’s evidence at count II.  See Yocum, 127 Fed. Appx. at 591 (stating that
Yocum argued that there “was insufficient evidence to establish that she possessed 22.5
grams of crack cocaine found in the hotel room where she was arrested”).
Yocum’s “acceptance of responsibility” in this case refers to the remorse that she
felt after her trial and conviction, rather than her acceptance prior to going to trial.  Both
she and her counsel noted her rehabilitative efforts at her resentencing hearing and urged
the District Court to reduce her sentence on that basis.  That after-the-fact remorse was
rewarded by the District Court, which generously reduced her term of imprisonment by
one year when she was resentenced in accordance with Booker.
Although Yocum’s post hoc acceptance of responsibility is commendable, a
defendant’s realization that what she did was wrong does not provide a legal basis for a
reduction in her offense level under Section 3E1.1 of the Guidelines.  Accordingly, we
will affirm the sentence imposed by the District Court.
